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Abstract. SCADA and industrial control systems have been traditionally isolated in physically protected environments.
However, developments such as standardisation of data exchange protocols and increased use of IP, emerging wireless
sensor networks and machine-to-machine communication mean that in the near future related threat vectors will require
consideration too outside the scope of traditional SCADA security and incident response. In the light of the signiﬁcance of
SCADA for the resilience of critical infrastructures and the related targeted incidents against them (e.g. the development
of stuxnet), cyber security and digital forensics emerge as priority areas. In this paper we focus on the latter, exploring
the current capability of SCADA operators to analyse security incidents and develop situational awareness based on a
robust digital evidence perspective. We look at the logging capabilities of a typical SCADA architecture and the analytical
techniques and investigative tools that may help develop forensic readiness to the level of the current threat environment
requirements. We also provide recommendations for data capture and retention.
1. Introduction
An Industrial Control System (ICS) is an information sys-
tem used to control industrial processes. Industrial control
systems include Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC). SCADA systems his-
torically distinguish themselves from other ICS by being the
largest subgroup of ICS systems and large scale processes that
can include multiple sites and large distances. Traditionally,
control systems have been operated as isolated systems with
no network connection to the the rest of the world. Therefore,
threats against these systems were limited to physical dam-
age attacks or data tampering that originated from inside the
system. However, the introduction of emerging technologies
along with the connection of such systems to the Internet
in order to improve them in performance and effectiveness
have exposed the once closed systems to the various internet
threats. Additionally, the very nature of SCADA systems, that
can be part of a national critical infrastructure, makes them
increasingly an attractive potential target for a variety of threat
agents and attack vectors, ranging from disgruntled insiders
and dissident groups to foreign states.
This whole new environment in which SCADA systems
operate urges the need for more secure implementations and
better protection solutions. The ability to respond to security
incidents along with the ability to analyse and learn from what
happened is crucial. Towards this direction, digital forensics
is an area of signiﬁcant importance which however has been
neglected in favour of operational convenience.
Collecting evidence related to the incident can reveal the
actions that took place during the incident along with the
incentives and perhaps the identity of the attacker. The whole
process of evidence collection and analysis has to conform
with certain regulations, such as the ACPO guidelines [8], in
order to preserve the authenticity and integrity of the ﬁndings
so that they can be used to raise legal accusations against the
identiﬁed perpetrators. Identifying the actions that took place
during the incident can also disclose the vulnerabilities that the
system bears upon which the attack was based. Understanding
these weaknesses can help in strengthening the system against
future attacks. A forensic investigation gives the ability to rely
on robust evidence in order to respond to the changing nature
of domestic and alien threats and ensures that enough learning
takes place in order to deploy resilient systems.
In this paper we investigate the digital forensic capabilities
in SCADA systems. We discuss the challenges that emerge
during evidence collection and analysis due to the lack of
security-oriented logging mechanisms and the existence of
legacy devices that may still be in use in many ICS. We also
provide certain recommendations to enhance the forensic pro-
cess as well as analytical techniques and tools that may help
develop forensic readiness.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2. we provide
a description of the SCADA architecture. In Section 3. we
present the state of art digital forensics capabilities in SCADA
systems. Section 4. introduces certain recommendations
regarding actions that will facilitate a forensic investigation.
Lastly, our conclusions are presented in Section 5.
2. High level SCADA system architecture
All SCADA systems base their function on measurements
taken from sensors and instruments regarding the process or
the system that they monitor and control. Those sensors and
instruments are connected to ﬁeld control devices such as
PLCs and remote terminal units (RTUs) and convert the input
signals into digital data and make decisions based on program
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Figure 1. SCADA system block diagram (∗IDSs and Firewalls are not typi-
cal parts of a SCADA system, however they are essential for security).
logic or commands from the system operators. SCADA sys-
tems consist of two main component types: the control centre
and the various ﬁeld devices it controls. The two parts are
connected to each other via a SCADA server.
The control centre’s components include operator worksta-
tions also known as Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs), engi-
neering workstations, plant data historians, databases and var-
ious shared resources. Control centre components communi-
cate with each other through the management network, and
with the ﬁeld devices and other SCADA networks utilising
the SCADA server. The SCADA server functions as the sole
interface between the control centre and one or more sites for
which the control centre is responsible. The server is usually
implemented with vendor speciﬁc software and its services are
often based on the OPC (‘open connectivity via open stan-
dards’1) standard, which is maintained by the OPC Founda-
tion as interoperability standard for industrial automation and
related domains. The physical site contains the actual process
system. It has three types of components: the control devices,
such as the programmable logic controllers, remote terminal
units, input/output controllers (IOCs) and intelligent electronic
devices (IEDs), the I/O devices such as sensors that perform
measurements and actuators that perform control actions, and
the SCADA gateway. A control network interconnects compo-
nents within a site utilising various application speciﬁc proto-
cols, e.g. Modbus and DPN3 [4]. Figure 1 illustrates a typical
SCADA system as a block diagram, when security is also taken
into account. In order to maintain security in the system, a ﬁre-
wall is used between the corporate network and the Internet
to block unwanted trafﬁc from the Internet. Another ﬁrewall is
used between the corporate network and the control network in
order to block unwanted access form inside the corporate net-
work. Intrusion Detection Systems are deployed in the Control
Network and the SCADA server in order to detect and log any
unwanted access to the system.
1http://www.opcfoundation.org
3. Current digital forensic capabilities of SCADA systems
Log ﬁles constitute a critical source of evidence in a digital
forensic investigation. In the traditional IT domain, keeping
log ﬁles is usually enforced by security policies. However, in
the ﬁeld of control systems logging focuses mostly on the pro-
duction monitoring and to support troubleshooting. Thus, even
though control systems are engineered so that transactions
and activity are closely monitored, resulting log ﬁles may lack
valuable information required by an investigation [3].
Legacy equipment or conventional networked control
devices do not retain network trafﬁc that could provide valu-
able evidence in an investigation. Enabling network trafﬁc
monitoring and logging would require more advanced archi-
tectures and additional IT components. In [4] the authors
describe an architecture that supports post mortem analysis of
SCADA network trafﬁc. In fact, it exploits current capabili-
ties in order to provide an audit and logging mechanism. The
architecture makes use of “agents” at speciﬁc locations within
a SCADA system. These agents forward network packets to a
central data warehouse where they are stored for future usage
in case of a security incident. This way, a complete history
of the network activity can be retrieved by reconstructing
network events from packet fragments captured.
Depending on the nature of a SCADA system different
data can be extracted from its various components during a
forensic analysis. According to [3] control systems can be
categorised into modern/common, modern/proprietary and
legacy/proprietary systems, depending on the technology used.
3.1 Modern/Common Control Systems Technologies
Control Centre: In modern/common control technology sys-
tems the components of the control centre (engineering work-
stations, databases historians and HMIs) base their function
on mostly well-known technologies. Most of them use either
Windows operating systems or some sort of UNIX platform
or a combination of them. Therefore, common data acquisi-
tion techniques can be applied. Data recovery on these devices
can rely on contemporary digital forensic tools, such as the
EnCase digital forensics suite or the FTK forensics toolkit.
Information gathered from logging mechanisms and volatile
data (such as memory data and data form registers) are the
main sources of evidence. If the system is still running, which
is the case in most instances, the investigator should also
obtain valuable information from the running processes. How-
ever, special care is needed since an accidental change on the
system may result not only in evidence corruption but also
in the abnormal function of the whole system. Due to these
restrictions, the opportunity of obtaining real-time data regard-
ing the system can be of vital importance. There exist a variety
of traditional examination tools that could be used, including
network sniffers as Wireshark where a plugin for the decod-
ing of ModBus protocols used in SCADA systems has been
developed, and Snort [7], which already incorporates signa-
tures related to SCADA. It is important to mention that HMIs
in modern/common deployments can offer valuable informa-
tion regarding the system’s state. It can guide the investigator
2
Incident Analysis & Digital Forensics in SCADA and Industrial Control Systems
towards the components of the system that impacted the pro-
duction environment. However, in many cases even though
HMIs are based on common operating systems, they are often
modiﬁed in order to serve the system in the most efﬁcient way,
lacking thus non-essential services such as logging mecha-
nisms or having modiﬁed versions of them. Furthermore, even
though data can be extracted with an ofﬂine examination of an
HMI, the ﬁle structure may be so different that contemporary
digital forensic tools might not be able to handle. In such a
case, the investigator has to come in contact with the system
administrator in order to gather knowledge on the HMIs and
their way of function.
Field Devices: In general, ﬁeld devices do not employ any
logging mechanism. However, as mentioned in [3] informa-
tion regarding the network communication between the ﬁeld
devices and the rest of the system along with activities of the
ﬁeld devices can be found in the control centre part of the
SCADA system. Although, the technology of the ﬁled devices
should not be neglected since, in some cases, it might bear
some sort of logging mechanisms, the nature of the system
that requires the continuous run of the ﬁeld devices turns the
investigator’s attention exclusively towards the logs that can
be found in the control centre. Furthermore, data regarding the
ﬁeld devices’ operations can also be found in the memory or in
cash ﬁles in the various parts of the control centre. However,
due to the volatile nature of these data it would be beneﬁcial if
the incident response team collected volatile information avail-
able from the ﬁeld devices. In case ﬁeld devices are off, some
valuable information may be available inside these devices. In
this case, the investigator needs to have in depth knowledge of
the devices’ conﬁguration in order to be able to retrieve any
information available. Thus, the investigator should be in con-
tact with the system administrator or the engineer in charge
in order to draw this information. On the other hand if the
ﬁeld devices are still running then there is little that can be
done in order to obtain data from them. However, in case a
device carries advanced computing hardware then live anal-
ysis might be applied in order to extract information, which
would be lost if the device was shut off, of the running device
without interrupting its normal function. According to [3] such
information includes the device date and time, current active
processes and current running processes. Furthermore, imple-
menting network logging agents as described can provide valu-
able information, regarding network connections, open ports
and running applications when the system is running.
3.2 Modern/Proprietary Control Systems Technologies
Control Centre: Even though technology has achieved huge
advances, most industrial control systems base their func-
tion on modern/proprietary technologies that are 10+ years
old. Many of the incident analysis methods used in mod-
ern/common control systems can also be used in mod-
ern/proprietary systems since most of them base their function
on contemporary operating systems such as Windows and
Unix. However, due to their proprietary nature the whole pro-
cess may face difﬁculties. Therefore, when investigating a
modern but proprietary control system interaction between the
investigator and the vendor prior to the investigation is manda-
tory. Since these systems are still supported by the vendor,
lots of valuable information can be drawn through this inter-
action. For instance, although the type of ﬁle system utilised
by the data historian may be known, it might have undergone
certain modiﬁcation by the vendor in order to involve desir-
able characteristics. Such modiﬁcation may result in evidence
corruption during the collection phase, or even mislead the
investigator if there is no contact with the vendor. Regarding
HMIs in modern proprietary systems, although they utilise rel-
atively modern computing capabilities, the modiﬁcations upon
their services along with the unique services added by the
vendor can pose huge difﬁculties in the process of data acqui-
sition. These added services include fault tolerance capabilities
that perform automated job killing or real-time reallocation
of memory space. Such operations can lead in evidence loss.
Therefore, it is imperative that the unique characteristics of an
HMI be fully understood [3].
Field Devices: Modern/Proprietary ﬁeld devices may incor-
porate computing capabilities that can help an ex post incident
analysis, however, as with the components of the control cen-
tre, their unique vendor-based characteristics make the investi-
gation process more difﬁcult than in the modern/common con-
trol systems category. Collecting information about the devices
from the vendor becomes a necessity. However, as in the for-
mer category, network and activity logs may be found on the
control centre part of the system, though due to its proprietary
nature such functionalities might not be enabled. An interest-
ing point made by the authors in [3] is that such devices may
incorporate embedded vendor-speciﬁc security mechanisms.
In this case, the vendor has to inform the investigator about the
deployed security mechanisms in the ﬁeld devices since possi-
ble evidence may be found there.
3.3 Legacy/Proprietary Control Systems Technologies
Control Centre: When dealing with legacy equipment within
an industrial control system incident analysis seems to be
impossible. Since these systems were designed in such a way
so that to ensure data integrity and availability, the notion of ex
post analysis and security in general is absent. In most cases
logging mechanisms are absent and databases do not follow
the structure of modern databases. Therefore, traditional post-
mortem analysis methods cannot be applied. Furthermore, due
to the fact that such systems are not supported anymore by
the vendor little knowledge can be obtained regarding their
way of function and whether there are any possible sources
of evidence. Only the interaction with the owner of the equip-
ment may give the investigator some information regarding
the system, which however might seem useless due to the
inapplicability of analysis tools. As stated in [3] legacy HMIs
run mostly on proprietary systems or operating systems that
are no longer supported by the original vendor. However, in
case that they are legacy but common there might be a chance
to perform an ex post incident analysis. Furthermore, network
activity can be tracked and captured, however such systems
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also utilise serial-based communications in which case there
is no way of conducting an ex post incident analysis.
Field Devices: In most cases legacy ﬁeld devices do not
have any inherent mechanism that could aid an incident anal-
ysis. The investigator has to understand each speciﬁc device
based on the knowledge conveyed by the vendor (if the ven-
dor still supports these devices), otherwise it is practically
impossible to obtain any evidence. Furthermore, legacy ﬁeld
devices communicate through serial connections, which make
it impossible to capture network trafﬁc. These devices pose
considerable challenges to ex post analysts as their rapid rate
of sampling and data override in combination with the limited
amounts of memory and the very speciﬁc, fault-driven nature
of the retained data make it difﬁcult to extract very meaningful
information. It is generally advised when faced with the chal-
lenge of working with legacy and proprietary ﬁeld devices that
the vendor should be contacted and an experienced engineer
should be made available to support the investigation [3].
3.4 Digital forensic process
There are ﬁve basic steps when it comes to performing an
ex post incident analysis of any device [5,6], the examination
phase, the identiﬁcation phase, the collection phase, the analy-
sis phase and the documentation phase.
Examination: In the examination phase the investigator
has to understand all the potential sources of evidence in a
SCADA system. In addition, any other system related to the
SCADA system under investigation also needs to be taken into
account. This includes access terminals, logging servers and
routers. Since the conﬁguration of a SCADA system can vary
signiﬁcantly even across similar devices, information regard-
ing the system and its components has to be gathered prior
to the investigation. At a minimum the following information
should be obtained:
(1) Network diagrams
(2) Conﬁguration details
(3) Change logs if available
(4) Authentication credentials
Identiﬁcation: The starting point of the identiﬁcation stage
is the identiﬁcation of the type of system under investigation.
Once the type of system has become known, the next step is to
identify the operating system that is used, the types and man-
ufacture of the PLCs, and the network design and implemen-
tation. The manufacturer’s documentation, the design speciﬁ-
cations, network diagrams can assist the identiﬁcation process.
In a more general sense the identiﬁcation step encompasses the
correlation of the information gathered from the examination
process in order to ﬁnd the proper tools that can be used, based
on the hardware and software speciﬁcations, to the next step
of data collection. In general, in digital forensics it is common
that the examination and the identiﬁcation step be considered
as one phase in the whole process.
Collection: The collection phase involves the collection of
data from all the memory systems that have been identiﬁed in
the previous step. Network trafﬁc between the identiﬁed sys-
tem’s components, such as network trafﬁc between the con-
trol network and the management network, and between the
SCADA system and the Internet should also be captured. It is
important that the investigator collects all types of information
including both volatile and dynamic data. Information with
higher volatility should be given higher priority. Some of the
most crucial areas to check for volatile data include registers,
caches, physical and virtual memories, network connections,
running processes, and disks. Captured data must be saved in
external devices, in a secure and safe place, so that they may
be safely removed and kept ofﬂine. In [1] the authors list the
order of volatility in a computer system as:
• Registers, cache
• Routing table, address resolution protocol (ARP) cache, pro-
cess table, kernel statistics
• Memory
• Temporary ﬁle systems
• Disk
• Remote logging and relevant monitoring data
• Physical conﬁguration, network topology
• Archival media
Analysis: In the analysis phase evidence is identiﬁed in the
data collected. Eventually, a timeline of activities based on the
data that was gathered in the collection phase is created. The
major categories of ex post incident analysis can be deﬁned
using the notion of abstraction layers [2].
Physical Media Analysis: The analysis of the physical
media translates the contents of a storage layout to a standard
interface (e.g. IDE or SCSIs). Examples include a hard disk,
compact ﬂash, and memory chips. The analysis of this layer
includes processing the custom layout and even recovering
deleted data after it has been overwritten.
Media Management Analysis: In the analysis of media
management, evidence sources are organized based on certain
data structures criteria. Examples of this layer include divid-
ing a hard disk into partitions, organising multiple disks into
a volume, and integrating multiple memory chips into mem-
ory space. This process may not be applicable for all type of
media. For instance, a database may access an entire hard disk
without creating partitions.
File System Analysis: The analysis of the ﬁle system layer
of abstraction, which translates the bytes and sectors of the
partition to directories and ﬁles, involves viewing directories
and ﬁle contents leading to the recovery of deleted ﬁles.
Application Analysis: Analysis in this layer includes
viewing log ﬁles, conﬁguration ﬁles, images, documents and
reverse engineering executables. The input data will typically
come from the ﬁle system, but applications such as databases
may read directly from the disk.
Network Analysis: Analysis in this layer includes manag-
ing network packets and IDS alerts. Analysis of logs generated
by network services, a ﬁrewall or web server for instance, falls
under the Network Analysis.
Memory Analysis: Analysis in this area includes identify-
ing the code that a process was running and extracting sensi-
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tive data that was stored in this code. Traditional digital foren-
sics applications such as the EnCase and the FTK can be used
in each abstraction layer in order to extract the available evi-
dence. However, unsupported data structures that may be used
in legacy control systems can raise signiﬁcant challenges in the
analysis of the collected evidence.
Documentation: In every investigation process, it is impera-
tive to maintain comprehensive documentation. Detailed notes
have to be kept with records of time, date, and the person
responsible plus other essential information. This way it is
assured that no evidence has been tampered with by someone
from inside during the forensic analysis.
4. Recommendations
Based on our review of the state of art capabilities we have
identiﬁed the following key areas where action should be taken
in order to develop investigative readiness that matches the
level of perceived risk. We describe each recommendation in
further detail in this section.
Identify gaps in digital investigation skills: It is impor-
tant to understand the available level of (or the lack of) skill
and knowledge of investigative expertise among existing staff.
There may be adequate understanding of incident responding
procedures but not a well-developed sense of the impact of
mitigating actions to potential evidence sources. Such a review
will facilitate the integration of investigative and analytical
skills with the existing structure for incident handling and
ensure that where possible pointers to resources on ex post
analysis will be taken into account.
Identify physical and cyber response interfaces: A review
of organisational roles and responsibilities involved in incident
response, including operational, physical security and cyber
incidents, may facilitate the integration of the responding
capability from both physical and cyber perspective. Although
each role will have dedicated responsibilities, several out-
comes may be related, or the impact of an incident may be
cross-domain (as in the example of stuxnet). In such cases
a well-coordinated response is required, including personnel
from all affected functions. Unless there is effective interfacing
of all these, it will be difﬁcult to assess the true dimensions of
a security breach and to ensure that there is enough evidence
retained. Such a review will at the very least enable the per-
sonnel involved to be identiﬁed and brought together, which
in itself may improve the coordination of the response func-
tion. Further to this other synergies may be developed such as
harmonising of the related procedures, more accurate impact
assessment and improved cross-domain risk understanding.
Understand where evidence may be found: As part of
the traditional risk assessment process, it may be beneﬁcial to
consider along with the scenarios of security breaches where
evidence is crucial and to identify where this evidence could
be found. In following best practice an analysis of potential
attacks would need to be performed anyway, so the considera-
tion of the associated data that could be generated in the course
of such scenario unfolding is something that is feasible. This
exercise will increase conﬁdence in both the operating person-
nel that evidence acquisition may be possible and unobtrusive
and to the IT specialists who will have a clearer picture of the
impact of responding actions.
Understand the impact of data retention: It is recom-
mended that some form of impact assessment of data retention
policies is performed on a test infrastructure that resembles the
operating environment. It is essential to develop an understand-
ing of whether any overhead is introduced (and how much if
so), when enabling more advanced logging features over and
above the traditional fault recording and performance-tracking
paradigm of operation. If evidence retention is deemed essen-
tial, then the cultural barrier of the end user community created
by the focus on operational need will need to be overcome
based on sound testing evidence. On the other hand, where the
absolute priority is the safety of the system there may be lim-
ited opportunity to enable logging and data retention features.
Manage obsolescence and the IT/Ops interface: Albeit
not directly related, a structured plan for obsolescence manage-
ment, where applicable, will ensure that adequate knowledge
of legacy systems exists and that access to the appropriate facil-
ities for their management is possible. Such plan should iden-
tify gaps in skills and knowledge for operating the legacy sys-
tem and provide the means for continuity of operating experi-
ence, e.g. through mentoring schemes of younger engineering
personnel by experienced senior technical managers and prin-
cipal engineers. More broadly, the management of the inter-
face between IT and ops planning is also essential in order to
ensure visibility of the concerns of both communities (opera-
tional and technical personnel vs IT specialists). The develop-
ment of shared understanding of key issues is essential in order
to overcome cultural barriers and the silo mentality that both
could develop. Filling the gaps that are created because of this
and ensuring smooth interaction is essential in order to ensure
an integrated approach in responding to security incidents and
be able to analyse the available evidence.
Deploy adequate security controls – ﬁrewalls and intru-
sion detection systems: The cornerstone of effective security
management, which will lend itself in credible capability for
ex post incident analysis, is the implementation of appropriate
and well-measured controls able to balance the risk and pro-
vide mechanisms to counter and follow up incidents. These
controls include ﬁrewalls and intrusion detection systems and,
although they are not formally a part of the typical architec-
ture of a SCADA system, we feel that they should be viewed
as essential to implement by end users.
Design systems with evidence protection in mind: Ade-
quate protection of data historians is essential for forensic-
grade evidence retention. Contemporary systems may be able
to log a variety of events but if the access to the logs is compro-
mised an attacker could easily erase their tracks. Therefore one
needs to ensure that access controls and strong authentication
are in place so that accesses of vital evidence on the data his-
torians are monitored and recorded. Consideration for secure
storage of log ﬁles needs to be given, for instance to write once
read many (WORMs), external discs or tape, or validation of
their integrity via cryptographic means of hash functions (such
as MD5) if the former is not possible.
Enable logging of common events across the system as
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a minimum: Most contemporary control systems and equip-
ment at device level are capable of producing and retaining a
wealth of information related to their operational status and
also to contextual events. However what events can be logged
and the exact form of the data may vary tremendously from
one equipment vendor to another. Even worse, some vendors
may only record incidents in proprietary forms that may be dif-
ﬁcult to integrate with the evidence sourced from more com-
mon devices (that may be in the form of raw text, comma sep-
arated values, spreadsheets etc.). In order to make the most of
evidence collection a twofold approach should be considered:
(1) Enabling the logging of common features, including as a
minimum across components:
• Event time(s) and date(s).
• Process IDs.
• Error codes, where applicable.
• Host and connecting machine IDs, where applicable.
• User IDs, where possible (e.g. process owner)
• Any other relevant data (e.g. exploit reference etc.)
(2) Developing a uniﬁed framework for event recording and
incident sharing that facilitates common understanding
between stakeholders and data analytics and correlation
of the retained data. This is a matter of signiﬁcance for
both intra- and inter-organisation collaboration and can
be built on established approaches such as the VERIS
community framework 2. This provides a structured way
for populating logged data into a predeﬁned schema that
describes comprehensively an incident.
Enable forensic-grade evidence acquisition processes:
Response procedures could be modiﬁed to enable forensic-
grade evidence acquisition where needed. This may require
greater involvement and collaboration of various people from
different teams. The latter also implies the need to train people
to understand their role in preserving evidential integrity when
handling potential evidence and to be able to make decisions
on whether to proceed with mitigation procedures, or to stop
in order to preserve and collect incident related data.
Inter-organisational and interstate cooperation: Enabling
inter-state collaboration is critical, as attacks may be targeted
across a number of sites, from a number of foreign jurisdic-
tions. Therefore in order to develop an accurate picture of
an incident there may be the need for multiple organisation
involvement, and the legal side of the analysis of relevant
evidence may be complex. As with every other aspect of
complex problems, experience sharing and multi party col-
laboration may enhance the chances of delivering a solution
that is broader and comprehensive. However the sharing of
security experiences is understandably hindered by many
factors. There exist many reasons for this, including fear of
negative publicity, unclear underpinning legislation, lack of
communication between stakeholders and peer roles across
organisations, lack of technical understanding of the feasibility
of anonymised data exchange etc. In the absence of struc-
tured frameworks for exchanging related information, various
2http://www.veriscommunity.net/doku.php
differences in culture, operational practice, risk perception,
status of technology adoption and maturity of technological
implementations may render ineffective any attempt to collab-
orate on the issue. Approaches like VERIS may thus facilitate
both inter-organisation and inter-state collaboration, as they
provide the grounds to develop shared understanding via safe
information exchange. Another dimension that could promote
community development would be a coordinated approach at
inter-state level, underpinned by some enabling mechanism of
guideline provision. The US example of NIST providing tech-
nical advice and developing guidelines in a federal capacity
for all institutions and organisations that are part of critical
national infrastructure is an example of this.
5. Conclusion
IP connectivity and machine-to-machine communication may
change fundamentally the way control processes are instru-
mented and deployed, so it is important to be able to under-
stand their potential impact. The management of legacy sys-
tems is a signiﬁcant issue, as well as understanding and bridg-
ing the gap generated by the fundamentally different life cycles
of typical control equipment and standard information tech-
nologies. Such issues are not necessarily directly related to
forensic readiness of an organisation, but may have profound
implications to the generation, retention and analysis of digital
evidence. Finally, skilled personnel and deep expertise are top
priority assets that an organisation should aim to develop and
maintain in order to ensure capability of high standard. Invest-
ments in developing both, through appropriate recruitment and
training programmes, technology acquisition implementation
of relevant frameworks ought to be considered seriously by
Executive Boards. Without their support, no effort to develop
this capability will have the chances to meet its full potential.
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